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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amicus curiae, the American Center for Law & Justice (“ACLJ”), is an 
organization dedicated to defending constitutional liberties secured by law.  ACLJ 
attorneys have argued before the Supreme Court of the United States and other 
federal and state courts in numerous cases involving constitutional issues.  E.g., 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009); McConnell v. FEC, 540 
U.S. 93 (2003); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384 (1993). ACLJ attorneys also have participated as amicus curiae in numerous 
cases involving constitutional issues before the Supreme Court and lower federal 
courts. 
 The ACLJ has been active in litigation concerning the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(“PPACA”). The ACLJ filed amici curiae briefs in Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010), appeal filed,  No. 10-2388 (6th 
Cir.  Dec. 15, 2010), and Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d. 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010).   
 Additionally, the ACLJ represents the plaintiffs in Mead v. Holder, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592 (D. D.C. February 22, 2011), appeal filed, No. 11-5047 
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 2011), another case challenging the individual mandate’s 
                                                 
1 This brief is filed with the consent of the parties. 
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2 
constitutionality on the grounds that it exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power.  The ACLJ has an interest that may be affected by this case because any 
decision by this court would be persuasive authority in Mead. 
 This brief is also filed on behalf of United States Representatives Paul 
Broun, Robert Aderholt, Todd Akin, Michele Bachmann, Spencer Bachus, Roscoe 
Bartlett, Rob Bishop, John Boehner, Larry Bucshon, Dan Burton, Francisco 
“Quico” Canseco, Eric Cantor, Steve Chabot, Mike Conaway, Blake Farenthold, 
John Fleming, Bill Flores, Randy Forbes, Virginia Foxx, Trent Franks, Scott 
Garrett, Louie Gohmert, Ralph Hall, Tim Huelskamp, Bill Johnson, Walter Jones, 
Mike Kelly, Steve King, Jack Kingston, John Kline, Doug Lamborn, Jeff Landry, 
James Lankford, Robert Latta, Donald Manzullo, Thaddeus McCotter, Cathy 
McMorris Rodgers, Gary Miller, Jeff Miller, Randy Neugebauer, Steve Pearce, 
Mike Pence, Joe Pitts, Mike Pompeo, Scott Rigell, Phil Roe, Ed Royce, Lamar 
Smith, and Tim Walberg, all members of the United States House of 
Representatives in the One Hundred Twelfth Congress.   
 This brief is also filed on behalf of the Constitutional Committee to 
Challenge the President and Congress on Health Care, which consists of over 
70,000 Americans from across the country who oppose the individual mandate. 
Amici are dedicated to the founding principles of limited government, and to the 
corollary precept that the Commerce Clause contains boundaries that Congress 
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may not trespass no matter how serious the nation’s healthcare problems. These 
amici believe that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to require 
that people purchase government-approved health insurance or pay a penalty.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress 
to regulate economic activity. Contrary to the government’s thesis, the Commerce 
Clause has never been understood to encompass all “conduct” that affects interstate 
commerce. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has twice repudiated the argument 
that the Commerce Clause is that elastic. The Commerce Clause does not authorize 
Congress to regulate the inactivity of American citizens by requiring them to buy a 
good or service (such as health insurance) as a condition of their lawful residence 
in this country. The decision not to engage in interstate commerce is not interstate 
commerce. Because the individual mandate provision of the PPACA requires 
citizens to purchase health insurance or be penalized, the PPACA exceeds 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. 
 The individual mandate’s unconstitutionality requires the entire PPACA to 
fall. Although an earlier version of the health care legislation contained a 
severability clause, the PPACA does not, and, by the government’s admission, the 
PPACA’s remaining provisions cannot function without the individual mandate.  
These two factors lead inexorably to the conclusion that Congress would not have 
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passed the PPACA without the individual mandate.  Consequently, because the 
individual mandate provision is unconstitutional and not severable from the 
remainder of the PPACA, the entire PPACA must be held invalid. 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. SECTION 1501 OF THE PPACA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
BECAUSE IT EXCEEDS CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY UNDER THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE. 
 
 The Supreme Court has recognized that  
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated 
powers.  See [U.S. Const.] art. I, § 8.  As James Madison wrote, “the 
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the 
State governments are numerous and indefinite.  
 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting The Federalist No. 45, 
at 292–93 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)).   
When President Harry Truman sought to expand federal power over a 
substantial portion of the economy by seizing American steel mills, the Supreme 
Court was keenly aware of the threat to the Constitution and to Americans’ liberty.  
As Justice Frankfurter explained in his concurring opinion, to provide effective 
“limitations on the power of governors over the governed,” this Nation’s founders 
[R]ested the structure of our central government on the system of 
checks and balances.  For them the doctrine of separation of powers 
was not mere theory; it was a felt necessity. . . .  These long-headed 
statesmen had no illusion that our people enjoyed biological or 
psychological or sociological immunities from the hazards of 
concentrated power. . . .  The accretion of dangerous power does not 
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come in a day.  It does come, however slowly, from the generative 
force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the 
most disinterested assertion of authority. 
 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Federalism, and the restriction of 
Congress’s power to certain enumerated ends, is as much a part of the 
constitutional plan to limit “the power of the governors over the governed” as the 
separation of powers. By acting beyond its enumerated powers in forcing 
Americans to buy government-approved health insurance or pay a penalty, 
Congress has disregarded the constitutional restrictions that are meant to protect 
individual liberty. 
A. Section 1501 Far Exceeds the Boundaries of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause Power as Delineated in Supreme Court 
Precedents. 
 
 Article I, Section 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian tribes.” Although this power’s scope has been held to be broadened 
from the original understanding of a power to “prescribe the rule by which 
commerce is to be governed,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 
(1824), the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress’s assertion and 
exercise of this power has limits. 
 A review of four key Commerce Clause cases demonstrates that Section 
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1501 of the PPACA exceeds the outer bounds of Congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause and underscores that the district court correctly decided that the 
individual mandate is unconstitutional. 
 In particular, the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to 
“regulate” inactivity by requiring individuals to buy a good or service (such as 
health insurance) as a condition of their lawful residence in the United States. Nor 
does the clause ignore the line between abstract decision-making and concrete 
economic or commercial activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. 
The Commerce Clause does not license Congress to force new participants into a 
market to benefit existing, willing market participants, nor does it give Congress 
carte blanche to include unconstitutional provisions within a larger scheme 
regulating commercial activity. 
1. Neither Wickard nor Raich supports a power to regulate 
inactivity. 
 
 In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Supreme Court upheld 
provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act that authorized a penalty to be 
imposed on Filburn for growing more wheat than the marketing quota set for his 
farm.  The Act restricted wheat production to limit supply and stabilize market 
prices.  Id. at 115.  Filburn grew more than twice the quota for his farm. He 
typically sold a portion of his wheat in the marketplace, used a portion to feed his 
livestock and family, and kept the rest for future use.  Id. at 114–15. He argued that 
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the Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the activities 
regulated were local and had only an indirect effect upon interstate commerce. Id. 
at 119.  The Court upheld the Act, stating that “even if appellee’s activity be local 
and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, 
be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce. . . .”  Id. at 125. 
 The Court reviewed a summary of wheat industry economics that outlined 
the interrelationship between market prices and wheat supply in local communities, 
the United States, and the world, id. at 125–28, and observed that “[t]he effect of 
the statute before us is to restrict the amount [of wheat] which may be produced for 
market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by 
producing to meet his own needs.”  Id. at 127 (emphasis added).  In other words, 
the penalty targeted farmers who, like Filburn, grew far more wheat than the 
amount needed to fill their own demand in order to sell most of the excess in the 
market.  
 Wickard does not support Section 1501.  The statute in Wickard targeted a 
specific economic activity—over-producing wheat, the excess of which was often 
sold in the market—which substantially affected prices in the interstate market for 
that commodity. The statute regulated farmers who were growing and selling 
wheat.  Wickard thus does not stand for the proposition that Congress may regulate 
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all “conduct”—including the “act” of deciding not to engage in commerce—that 
has, in the aggregate, a substantial effect on interstate commerce, as the 
government argues.  Br. for Appellant 17, 30-34.  Rather, the Court, in Wickard, 
held that Congress may regulate purely local economic activity (growing a 
marketable commodity that may be sold in the market or consumed by the grower) 
when that economic activity, in the aggregate, is directly tied to and substantially 
affects interstate commerce. See also Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1164 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (rejecting similar 
argument that Wickard expanded the Commerce Clause to encompass “economic 
decisions” affecting interstate commerce). In short, all economic activity is 
conduct, but not all conduct is economic activity for Commerce Clause purposes.  
 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), the case most relied upon by the 
government, goes no further than Wickard did. In Raich, the Court considered 
whether Congress could regulate marijuana grown and consumed within a state as 
part of a broader scheme regulating interstate markets for marijuana. Id. at 9.  
Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which created a “closed regulatory 
system,” manufacturing, distributing, or possessing marijuana was a criminal 
offense.  Id. at 14. California residents who wanted to use marijuana for medicinal 
purposes under state law brought a suit alleging that “the CSA’s categorical 
prohibition of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the 
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intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant 
to California law exceeds Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 
15 (emphasis added). 
 The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge. The Court noted that the 
plaintiffs did not contend that Congress lacked the power to regulate manufacture 
and possession of marijuana. See id. at 9. From that premise, the Court went on to 
note that “[o]ur case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely 
local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  Id. at 17 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added).  Moreover, “[w]hen Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a 
practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.”  Id. 
(citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154–55 (1971)). As such, “when ‘a 
general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis 
character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’” 
Id.  (citation omitted). 
 The Court stated that Wickard’s key holding was that “Congress can regulate 
purely intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced 
for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut 
the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.” Id. at 18. The Court 
declared that in both Wickard and the case before it, “the regulation is squarely 
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within Congress’ commerce power because production of the commodity meant 
for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply 
and demand in the national market for that commodity.”  Id. at 19. Importantly, the 
Court emphasized that “the activities regulated by the CSA [including the 
plaintiffs’ activities] are quintessentially economic. . . .”    Id. at 25 (emphasis 
added). 
 Because the manufacture and distribution of marijuana was an economic 
class of activity that Congress could regulate, 
Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the 
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a 
gaping hole in the CSA. Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted 
comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible 
commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority to “make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8. That the regulation 
ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment.  As we have 
done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of 
that larger scheme. 
 
Id. at 22.   
The Court described the marijuana ban as “merely one of many ‘essential 
part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme 
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.’”  Id. at 24–25 
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). 
 In contrast to Raich, this case is not an as-applied challenge to a concededly 
valid regulatory scheme.  Rather, Plaintiffs here contend that Section 1501 exceeds 
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Congress’s authority and should be declared unconstitutional. Thus, Raich’s 
emphasis on courts’ reluctance to prohibit individual applications of a valid 
statutory scheme due to the de minimis nature of the impact of the plaintiff’s local 
conduct is inapposite to this case. 
 In addition, the statute in Raich (like the statute in Wickard) sought to 
discourage an ongoing “quintessentially economic” activity:  “the production, 
distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, 
and lucrative, interstate market.” Id. at 25–26.  The Court repeatedly emphasized 
that the substantial effects test governs the authority of Congress to target 
“activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities.’”  Id. at 17 (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted).  Since the statutory scheme was concededly valid, the 
Court presupposed that “the [regulated] class of activities . . . [was] within the 
reach of federal power.” Id. at 23.  By contrast, Section 1501 does not regulate an 
ongoing economic class of activities “within the reach of federal power.”  See id.  
Lawful presence in the United States, without more, is not an economic activity 
akin to producing and distributing a marketable commodity.  Raich does not 
support the idea that Congress may regulate abstract decisions to not purchase a 
good or service—that is, to not engage in commerce—and force people to purchase 
that good or service. 
 Wickard and Raich held only that federal regulation of a particular type of 
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economic activity—producing and consuming a marketable commodity—can, in 
some circumstances, be applied to reach that type of existing economic activity at a 
purely local level when doing so is necessary and proper to the effective national 
regulation of that economic activity. They do not stand for the broad proposition 
that Congress has free reign to pass otherwise unconstitutional laws by including 
them within a larger regulatory program. 
2. Lopez and Morrison repudiate the government’s argument 
the Congress’s Commerce Clause power encompasses all 
“conduct” that substantially affects interstate commerce. 
 
 The Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) establish that the 
Commerce Clause cannot be stretched to encompass all “conduct” that affects 
interstate commerce.  In Lopez, the Court held that the Gun Free School Zones Act, 
which prohibited possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, exceeded 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because it had “nothing to do with  
‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define 
those terms.” 541 U.S. at 561. The Court discussed Gibbons v. Ogden—the Court’s 
first comprehensive review of the Commerce Clause—which stated that 
“‘[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more:  it is intercourse. It 
describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all 
its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that 
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intercourse.’” Id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189–90). The Gibbons Court 
observed that the power to “regulate” commerce is the power to “‘prescribe the 
rule by which commerce is to be governed’” and noted that “‘[t]he enumeration [of 
the power] presupposes something not enumerated.’” Id. (quoting Gibbons, 22 
U.S. at 194–95, 196); see also id. at 585–88 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that 
the original understanding of the Commerce Clause was much more limited than 
the Court’s modern interpretation). 
 The Lopez Court reiterated the observation made in NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), that the Commerce Clause  
[M]ust be considered in the light of our dual system of government and 
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce 
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex 
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is 
national and what is local and create a completely centralized 
government.   
 
Lopez, 541 U.S. at 557 (citation omitted). The Court identified three “categories of 
activity” that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate: 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce.  Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from 
intrastate activities.  Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes 
the power to regulate those activities . . . that substantially affect 
interstate commerce. 
 
Id. at 558–59 (citations omitted). 
 The Court summarized cases dealing with the third category of activity as 
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holding that, “[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, 
legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”  Id. at 560 (emphasis added).  
The Act exceeded Congress’s authority because gun possession was not economic 
activity.  The Court found it significant that the Act “‘plows thoroughly new 
ground and represents a sharp break with the long-standing pattern of federal 
firearms legislation.’”  Id. at 563 (citation omitted). 
 The government argued in Lopez that the Court should focus on whether, 
through a chain of inferences, possessing guns in a school zone could, in the 
aggregate, be reasonably thought to substantially affect interstate commerce, rather 
than focusing on whether the statute targeted economic activity.  Additionally, the 
government cited the cost-shifting impact on the insurance system, arguing that 
gun possession may lead to violent crime, and “the costs of violent crime are 
substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread 
throughout the population.”  Id. at 563–64; see also Brief for the United States, at 
*28, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (No. 93-1260), 1994 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 410 (footnote omitted). 
 In rejecting the government’s unduly expansive view of congressional 
power, the Court found significant 
the implications of the Government’s arguments.  The Government 
admits, under its “costs of crime” reasoning, that Congress could 
regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to 
violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate 
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commerce. . . . Similarly, under the Government’s “national 
productivity” reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it 
found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: 
family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for 
example.  Under the theories that the Government presents in support 
of § 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, 
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where 
States historically have been sovereign.  Thus, if we were to accept the 
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by 
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate. 
 
Id. at 564 (emphasis added). 
 The Court concluded that the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a 
plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation,” 
id. at 566, and stated that 
To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile 
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police 
power of the sort retained by the States. . . . To [so expand the clause’s 
scope] would require us to conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration 
of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, . . . and that 
there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what 
is truly local. 
 
Id. at 567–68 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also id. at 577–78 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the importance of federalism principles in 
interpreting the Commerce Clause’s scope). 
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), reinforced Lopez’s teaching 
that the Commerce power does not extend to all “conduct” that substantially 
affects interstate commerce.  In Morrison, the Court held that a portion of the 
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Violence Against Women Act, which provided a civil remedy for victims of 
sexually-motivated violence, exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority 
because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, 
economic activity.”  Id. at 613 (emphasis added).  Congress found that sexually-
motivated violence deters interstate travel and commerce, diminishes national 
productivity, increases medical costs, and decreases the supply of and demand for 
interstate products, id. at 615, but the Court rejected the argument “that Congress 
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s 
aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”   Id. at 617.  The Court noted that cases 
in which it had upheld an assertion of Commerce Clause authority due to the 
regulated activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce involved the 
regulation of “commerce,” an “economic enterprise,”  “economic activity,” or 
“some sort of economic endeavor.”   Id. at 610–11.  The Court observed that the 
government’s attenuated method of reasoning was similar to the reasoning offered 
in Lopez and raised concerns that “Congress might use the Commerce Clause to 
completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local 
authority.”   Id. at 615. 
 Section 1501 does not withstand scrutiny under Lopez and Morrison.  Being 
lawfully present within the United States, like possessing a gun within 1,000 feet 
of a school, is not a commercial or economic activity. The cases Lopez relied upon 
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referred to ongoing commercial or economic activities that Congress may 
regulate,2 and provide no support for the assertion that the power to “‘prescribe the 
rule by which commerce is to be governed’”  includes the power to force those 
who do not want to engage in a commercial or economic activity to do so.  See id. 
at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196).  As in Lopez, “[t]o uphold the 
Government’s contentions here,” would “bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained 
by the States.”   Id. at 567.  
 As the district court rightly concluded, Section 1501 “literally forges new 
ground and extends Commerce Clause powers beyond its current high watermark.” 
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 609 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
Judge Roger Vinson agreed with this point in another challenge to the PPACA, in 
which he wrote, based on the pertinent Commerce Clause and Necessary and 
Proper Clause cases, that the “power that the individual mandate seeks to harness 
is simply without prior precedent.” Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2010). There have been 
many times throughout American history when changing market conditions was a 
desirable goal, yet 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942); 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196. 
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never before has [Congress] used its commerce power to mandate that 
an individual person engage in an economic transaction with a private 
company.  Regulating the auto industry or paying “cash for clunkers”is 
one thing; making everyone buy a Chevy is quite another.  Even during 
World War II, the federal government did not mandate that individual 
citizens purchase war bonds. 
 
Randy E. Barnett, Is Health-Care Reform Constitutional?, Wash. Post, Mar. 21, 
2010, at B2.  Although the PPACA is the first federal law to cross the line between 
encouraging increased market activity and mandating individual purchases, it will 
certainly not be the last if it is upheld. 
 Lopez and Morrison establish that the power to regulate commerce is the 
power to regulate commercial or economic activity, however local or trivial in 
scope (at least so long as that local activity in the aggregate could reasonably be 
thought to substantially affect interstate commerce). One does not engage in 
commerce by deciding not to engage in commerce. Even the most expansive 
Supreme Court Commerce Clause cases do not support the notion that Congress 
can regulate inactivity or coerce commercial activity where none exists. 
B. The Government’s Argument that the Commerce Clause 
Empowers Congress to Regulate All “Conduct” that Affects 
Interstate Commerce Swallows All Meaningful Limits on 
Commerce Clause Power. 
 
 Although the government refers repeatedly to the decision not to purchase 
health insurance as “conduct” within the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power, that elastic label is no more availing than the term “economic decisions” 
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was in Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 
1120, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (holding that economic decisions should not be 
equated with economic activity for Commerce Clause purposes). Both terms are 
fatally flawed because they destroy any remaining boundaries on Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause.  
 Applying the government’s argument to obesity illustrates the point. 
Although genetic predisposition plays a role, the exponential increase in obesity 
results in significant part from human conduct: overeating, poor food choices, 
sedentary lifestyle habits. The link between obesity and rising health care costs is 
indisputable.  In September 2010, the Congressional Budget Office reported that 
health care spending per capita for obese adults exceeded spending for non-obese 
adults by about 8 percent in 1987 and by about 38 percent in 2007.3 CBO projected 
that if current levels of obesity do not diminish, “[P]er capita spending on health 
care for adults would rise by 65 percent—from $4,550 in 2007 to $7,500 in 2020.”4  
                                                 
3 Congressional Budget Office, Economic and Budget Issue Brief: How Does 
Obesity in Adults Affect Spending on Health Care? 1 (Sep. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/118xx/doc11810/09-08-Obesity_brief.pdf. 
4 Id.   
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 The Center for Disease Control has estimated the health care costs 
associated with obesity at $147 billion annually.5 Another study done recently by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research estimates annual obesity-related costs 
at closer to $167 billion, or nearly 17% of total health care costs.6  
  Moreover, the rise in health care costs caused by obesity is shifted onto other 
consumers in much the same way that increased costs stemming from uninsured 
persons are shifted. In fact, obesity adds about $2,800 to the average person’s 
annual health care costs.7 As another study concluded, “Obesity also has 
externalities associated with it—namely, mortality and health insurance costs. 
Because medical costs are higher for the obese and premiums do not depend on 
weight, lighter people in the same pool pay for the food/exercise decisions of the 
obese.” 8 
 The market incentives to regulate obesity among American citizens are 
                                                 
5 Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Study Estimates 
Medical Cost of Obesity May Be As High as $147 Billion Annually (July 
27, 2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2009/r090727.htm. 
6 John Cawley & Chad Meyerhofer, The Medical Care Costs of Obesity: An 
Instrumental Variables Approach, 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working 
Paper No. 16467, 2010), available at 
http://www2.binghamton.edu/economics/research/Meyerhoefer.pdf 
7 Id. 
8 Jay Bhattacharya & Neeraj Sood, Health Insurance, Obesity, and Its Economic 
Costs, in The Economics of Obesity: A Report on the Workshop Held at 
USDA’s Economic Research Service 21, 21 (Tomas Philipson et al. eds., 2004), 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/efan04004/efan04004.pdf. 
 
Case: 11-1057     Document: 104-1      Date Filed: 03/28/2011      Page: 27
21 
arguably as compelling as those motivating the individual mandate. If, as the 
government argues, the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate all 
“conduct” that, in the aggregate, affects the health care market, Congress could 
impose federal limitations on body-mass index, the measure that standardizes 
weight according to height. Such a law would be justified with the same arguments 
the government uses to defend Section 1501.  
 Similarly, Congress could determine that a lack of exercise—sedentary 
conduct—contributes to poor health, which increases health care expenses and the 
cost of health insurance, and threatens Congress’s attempt to lower health care and 
health insurance costs. Thus, under the government’s reasoning, Congress could 
require Americans to purchase health club memberships.  
 While the foregoing scenarios might seem farfetched, a recent hearing 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the PPACA’s constitutionality revealed 
they are not. The possibility of a “vegetable mandate” and compelled gym 
memberships were discussed at this hearing. While defending the individual 
mandate’s constitutionality, former Solicitor General and Harvard law professor 
Charles Fried testified that under the view of the commerce power that would 
justify the mandate, Congress could, indeed, mandate that everyone buy vegetables 
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and join a health club.9  Cf. Mead v. Holder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at 
*55–56 (D.D.C. February 22, 2011) (finding for Commerce Clause purposes little 
distinction between economic activity and “mental activity, i.e., decision-
making”).   
 As noted, principles of federalism and a limited federal government, like the 
separation of powers, are part of the system of checks and balances essential to 
limiting centralized governmental power and protecting liberty.  Upholding the 
individual mandate would effectively confer upon Congress “a plenary police 
power,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, over all individual economic decisions and place 
Americans’ economic liberty at risk. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinell v. Sebelius, 728 
F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010). This court should reject the government’s 
invitation to recognize such a broad power. 
II. BECAUSE SECTION 1501 IS NOT SEVERABLE FROM THE 
REMAINDER OF THE PPACA, THE ENTIRE ACT IS INVALID. 
 
Generally, holding one provision of a law unconstitutional does not 
invalidate the rest of the law if the unconstitutional provisions are severable.  
                                                 
9 The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Congress 4 (2011) (statement of Charles Fried, Professor, Harvard 
University), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-02-
02%20Fried%20Testimony.pdf  
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Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).  Section 1501 is not severable. 
Therefore, the PPACA is invalid in its entirety. .  
“The inquiry into whether a statute is severable is essentially an inquiry into 
legislative intent. ”   Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 
172, 191 (1999).  “Congress could not have intended a constitutionally flawed 
provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the 
legislation is incapable of functioning independently.”   Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. 
at 684.  A court must ask “whether [after removing the invalid provision] the 
[remaining] statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress.”   Id. at 685 (alteration in original) (original emphasis omitted).  
Two factors demonstrate that Congress did not intend Section 1501 to be 
severable:  First, Congress removed a severability clause from an earlier version of 
health care reform legislation; second, the PPACA’s remaining portions cannot 
function “in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress” without Section 
1501.  See id (original emphasis omitted).   
The Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962), which the House 
approved on November 7, 2009, contained an individual mandate section as well 
as a provision that stated, “[i]f any provision of this Act, or any application of such 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the 
remainder of the provisions of this Act and the application of the provision to any 
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other person or circumstance shall not be affected.”10 However, Congress did not 
include H.R. 3962’s severability provision in the final version.  That Congress 
decided not to include a severability clause in the PPACA as enacted is strong 
evidence that Congress did not intend for the statute’s individual provisions to be 
severable. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983) (“Where 
Congress includes [specific] language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it 
prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the [omitted provision] was not 
intended”) (alteration in original). 
Second, Congress itself believed the individual mandate is absolutely 
essential to PPACA’s primary purpose of making health insurance universally 
available and affordable. 
[I]f there were no [individual mandate], many individuals would wait to 
purchase health insurance until they needed care. . . . The [individual 
mandate] is essential to creating effective health insurance markets in which 
improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not 
exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold. 
 
PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(I), as amended by § 10106(a). Consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Alaska Airlines, Congress could not have intended the 
individual mandate to be severable if severing it would allow an inoperable or 
                                                 
10 H.R. 3962, § 255, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., Bill Summary & Status, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.3962: (click on “Text of 
Legislation,” then the link for “Affordable Health Care for America Act 
(Engrossed in House [Passed House]-EH)”). 
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counterproductive regulatory scheme to stand.  See 480 U.S. at 684; accord Free 
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161–62 
(2010).  The PPACA forbids providers from refusing health insurance coverage to 
individuals because of preexisting conditions.  PPACA § 1201.  Without the 
individual mandate, a person could refuse to purchase health insurance until he 
became injured or ill and required medical care.  Without the individual mandate, 
the resulting free-riding could soon cause any private or co-operative insurance 
provider that depends on premium dollars to become insolvent.  The PPACA 
contains exchanges made up of insurance providers, but does not contain any plan 
completely administered and supported by the government.  Because the 
envisioned insurance providers would depend upon premium dollars, the 
individual mandate is essential to bolster the providers’ solvency in each insurance 
exchange and thus the operation of the entire regulatory scheme.11  See Florida v. 
United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1162–63 
(N.D. Fla. 2011) (collecting numerous statements in government briefs 
highlighting the essential role the individual mandate played in Congress’s effort to 
reform the health insurance industry).   
                                                 
11 This is not to say that the connection between the individual mandate and the 
rest of the PPACA, while relevant to the severability issue, is a basis for 
concluding that the individual mandate is within Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause, as argued previously in this brief. 
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Because the individual mandate is so essential to the PPACA’s overall 
operation, the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that Congress could not have 
intended the individual mandate to be severable from the rest of the PPACA.  In 
fact, it is fair to say that without the individual mandate, it is highly probable there 
would be no PPACA.  These observations, along with the fact that Congress 
deleted a severability provision from an earlier version of the national health care 
reform legislation, lead inexorably to one conclusion:  the individual mandate is 
not severable from the PPACA’s remaining provisions.  Thus, because the 
individual mandate is unconstitutional, this court should hold that the entire 
PPACA invalid. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This court should affirm the district court’s judgment that PPACA is 
unconstitutional, and reverse its judgment that the individual mandate is severable 
from the rest of the statute. 
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